Bắc Triều Tiên nên học hỏi Việt Nam

[TheDeath]

Vietnam's model for N. Korea

<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">USA</st1:place></st1:country-region> Today 17-7-08

a broader vision and patience, the!With the right enticements, U.S. could pave the path for real — if gradual — progress in this obstinate communist regime.

By Michael O'Hanlon<o:p></o:p>
Is peace breaking out with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>? Just last month, <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region> presented <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Japan</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Russia</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">South Korea</st1:country-region> and the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> with a [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]. High on the list was the admission that [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ], most of it reprocessed into usable form over the past five years. In response, President Bush said he intends to remove <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region> from the terrorism list maintained by the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> government and to waive restrictions imposed for decades via the [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ].
(Illustration by Adrienne Lewis, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">USA</st1:country-region></st1:place> TODAY)

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After years of dickering, this progress is certainly good news, but we are hardly out of the woods. <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region> is mum about whether it has a second means of developing [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ] and about whether it helped countries such as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Syria</st1:place></st1:country-region> [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]. On the plutonium issue itself, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> has only begun to admit what it has. That is a far cry from actually giving up the material. This deal makes sense as an interim step, but it doesn't tell us what to do next.
This nation needs less debate about current tactics in dealing with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> and more focus on a broader strategy. Such a recalibration would make it easier to place tactical disagreements in perspective and perhaps even move toward some limited national consensus on how to handle what could again become a severe crisis.


<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s evolution
The key is to focus on basic change in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>. What might a reformed <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> look like? <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> today. That former <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> enemy has restructured its economy and begun to open its society and politics while [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]. The process started in the 1980s and accelerated thereafter, culminating in [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ] in the <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Clinton</st1:place></st1:City> era. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ] averaged just 2.6% in the '70s, but 3.6% in the '80s and more than 7% since then. Today, <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region> is about where <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region> was in the late 1970s. That is not a great place to be, but the analogy leaves room for hope.


To be sure, it would be wonderful if North Korean leaders would simply reject communism. But that's about as likely as leader [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ] giving up his luxury cars and [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]. The good news is that they (and he) need not. <st1:country-region w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:country-region> has proved that a more gradual path to reform can work for all concerned, including the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> and its regional allies.


With this idea in mind, the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> should make clear to <st1:country-region w:st="on">North Korea</st1:country-region> that generous aid with investment and trade awaits — but only to the extent <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> is serious about reform. The <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> should go beyond the nuclear issue and urge <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> to make deep cuts in conventional forces, eliminate chemical weaponry and ballistic missiles over time and improve human rights policies. As these things happen, the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region> could open the flow of aid and trade while encouraging others to do the same (primarily in direct assistance, not cash, since North Korean leaders tend to pocket the latter). If <st1:City w:st="on">Pyongyang</st1:City> refuses, we then might have an easier time persuading other countries to again increase the pressure on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> until it realizes it has no real alternative.


For those inclined to wince at the idea of negotiating with a Stalinist regime, everything can be gradual and verifiable. Some steps can be codified in treaties; others can be less formal. Of course, the critical issue is the plutonium, since a [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]. That should still be the focus, but not at the risk of missing the broader picture.
Some might ask why the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region> would complicate the elimination of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s plutonium by raising other issues. The reason is simple: The U.S. gets caught in a Catch-22 if it focuses only on plutonium. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> knows that its bomb-making materials are the only reason the world pays attention to such a forlorn, poor, small country. So it will not be likely to give up such materials unless the compensation is exorbitant. ([Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ].) Yet we can't buy up the plutonium without giving in to what would in effect be extortion.


Go bigger
What to do, then? As President Eisenhower said, "[Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ]." In this case, focusing on the broader North Korean reform agenda might be easier than on denuclearization alone. We cannot allow ourselves to be forced to buy out its plutonium stocks, but we can help <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> reform more comprehensively. Justifying aid to achieve greater reforms is an easier sell than making a payoff for plutonium. Besides, such fundtal changes inside <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> would help its long-suffering people while planting the seeds for an economic revival and future reforms. (Case in point: [Đăng nhập để xem liên kết. ].)
Our real carrots are not taking <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> off terrorism and enemy watch lists; doing so provides little direct benefit to the reclusive regime. The carrots are aid, trade, investment and diplomatic contact. We need a strategy for how to offer these enticements to leaders in <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Pyongyang</st1:place></st1:City>. The current debate over tactics obscures this core challenge; it is time for us to stretch our imaginations and think strategically instead. And when the negotiations get particularly difficult — and they will — it's worth remembering that as with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the fruits of patience are sometimes worth the wait.


Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is co-author with Mike Mochizuki of Crisis on the <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:PlaceName w:st="on">Korean</st1:PlaceName> <st1:PlaceType w:st="on">Peninsula</st1:PlaceType></st1:place>: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea.
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[Độc Cô Cầu Bại]

Không hiểu gì hết. Tại sao viết tiếng Anh tiếng U ở đây. Nick viết bài này chắc cao siêu lắm.

[phanphuong]

Bác TD điểm tin bằng tiếng Anh kiểu này thì chắc mình đuối quá, theo không kịp. Ít ra cũng có vài câu bình luận hoặc tóm tắt lại!

[khanhan2006_2009]

Nguyên văn bởi phanphuong

Bác TD điểm tin bằng tiếng Anh kiểu này thì chắc mình đuối quá, theo không kịp. Ít ra cũng có vài câu bình luận hoặc tóm tắt lại!

Đúng đấy anh ah,thấy cái chủ đề cũng hấp dẫn mà vô toàn Tiếng Anh tiếng Em=>thất vọng vì ko đủ trình độ đọc hiểu.